Abstract. Recently, there has been an interest in creating practical anonymous electronic cash with the ability to conduct payments of exact amounts, as is typically the practice in physical payment systems. The most general solution for such payments is to allow electronic coins to be divisible (e.g., each coin can be spent incrementally but total purchases are limited to the monetary value of the coin). In Crypto'95, T.
Introduction
Off-line untraceable electronic cash has sparked wide interest among cryptographers ( [CFNSO, FY93, Oka95, CP93a, PW92, Bra93b , BGK95, 0 0 9 2 , DC94, E094, FTY96, CMS96, CFMT96, DFTY971, etc) . In its simplest form, a n e-cash system consists of three parties (a bank B, a user U and a receiver R) a n d four main procedures (account establishment, withdrawal, payment and deposit). In a coin's life cycle, the user U first performs a n account establishment protocol to open an account with bank B. To obtain a coin U performs a withdrawal protocol with B and during a purchase U spends a coin by participating in a payment * College of Computer Science, Northeastern University, Boston, Massachusetts.e-mail:
ahchan@ccs.neu.edu has been recently proven to be asymptotically optimal [OY98] . Furthermore, all protocols are of comparable efficiency with the most efficient non-divisible offline e-cash systems available, except for the account establishment protocol which takes more than 4000 multi-exponentiations modulo a 1030 bit prime. 4 Hence, [Oka95] can be practical only if account establishment is performed infrequently (typically once) for each user. Account establishment is used to create a "license" with which coins are withdrawn; hence the cost of not performing it at each withdrawal is that withdrawals of coins using the same license can be linked. As noted by [PW92] , the more the user uses the same license the more likely he can be traced by other means (i.e., correlating various payments' locality, date, type, frequency, etc.). In fact, there have been independent results [Oka96] which reduce the computation of the account establishment of [Oka95] by two orders of magnitude. But our "account establishment" protocol is three orders of magnitude more efficient than [Oka95] (see Section 6), hence its functionality can be included in every withdrawal and, unlike [Oka95] , there is no trade-off between the degree of unlinkability among coins and efficiency attained. Alternatives to divisibility: In contrast to a divisible coin, an exact payment protocol using multiple single term coins was analyzed in [FPST97] . That result complements the protocol presented here, in the sense that [FPST97] is more efficient for small divisibility precisions ( N ) but it becomes impractical when higher precision is required. As analysed in detail in [Tsi97] , keeping multiple coins is in general (except for very large N ) faster at payment, but it becomes a bottleneck in storage and computation at withdrawal. The exact threshold deEach multi-exponentiation is equivalent to approximately 1.2 modular exponentiations.
pends on an additional parameter Ii, defined as "the number of exact payments that can be performed after one withdrawal"; for a 512 bit modulus the cornputation at withdrawal for the divisible system is smaller when A' . In % 2 48, while the storage requirements are smaller when A' . In Other approaches to exact payments involve having the user simply state the amount s/he is spending, by including the amount in the hash-computed challenge used for the payment (challenge semantics/electronic checks). Then, either the payment is checked on-line with the bank [PW92, Cha851 to prevent overspending, or a trustee is allowed to trace the user upon over-spending [JYSG] . Rut, in sevcral settings on-line payments are clearly undesirable, while providing divisibility "directly" allows the bank to call upon the trustee only when a judge orders such tracing (i.e., presumably much less frequently). Another online solution is making "change" with the bank just before a purchase [BGK95] . Methods for off-line "electronic checks" also exist [dCv+89, Bra93a1 dST981. However the model of electronic checks is quite different in the following respect: users can conduct only a single payment (unless of course there is on-line communication) regardless of the amount. Thus, "having $1,000 in one's wallet" is a relative term, since after e.g., a $1 purchase the "wallet" is empty. In this sense the model is a subset5 of the "Ii-payment model" presented in [FPST97], for li = 1. Yet another approach would be to ask the shop to return change, but this transfers the problem of "exact payments" to the shop, while it creates anonymity-related problems and it may require on-line communication with the bank for "refreshing" the anonymity of the returned change. Our contributions: The major advantage of our system is that the construction of the electronic license (the bulk of the computation in [Oka95]'s "user account establishment" protocol) can be performed with a few tens of exponentiations, while [Oka95] requires several orders of magnitude more (see Section 6 for details). Furthermore, in contrast to our scheme, the number of exponentiations in [Oka95] depends on the length of the RSA modulus (which is a potentially insufficient 512 bits in their efficiency calculations), impairing scalability.
Our system remains efficient during payment, while the size of our coin is around 300 bytes for a 512 bit modulus (see Section 6 for a detailed analysis).
An additional advantage to our system is that it is compatible with tracing methods for e-cash [CMSSG, DFTY97, FTYSG] , thus a full solution (e-cash with exact payments and anonymity revokation) can be employed. Transferability can also be added in a modular fashion, as described in Section 8.
We also present a tool for "range-bounded commitment" which has applications outside electronic cash (e.g., in group signatures [CS97] However, electronic checks allow unlinkability between 2 payments (the purchase and the refund); unlinkability between K payments is much more costly-see [Tsi97] for an analysis. tion 2, focusing on the account establishment and withdrawal protocols. In Section 3 we sketch our idea and illustrate the necessity of a multiplicative commitment, which is achieved using the range-bounded commitment presented in Section 4. Our scheme is then described in Section 5. Next we discuss the scheme's efficiency (Section 6) and its security (Section 7). We conclude with a discussion and open problems in Section 8. where P = 2Q + 1 with P, Q primes and g a generator of the subgroup GQ of
In the account establishment protocol the user obtains a license ( N , L1 = ( N + u l ) l l K mod 121, L2 = ( N + u 2 ) l l K mod 712) where (n,,A') is an RSA public key and a i ER Z:, is also public. To provide for anonymity of the user and security for the bank, this protocol takes approximately 4000 "multi-exponentiations" modulo a 1030 bit prime, assuming 256 bit primes p and q. Furthermore the number of exponentiations depends on the length of the RSA modulus. Due to an attack in [CFMT96] , Okamoto suggests a fix to this protocol, requiring approximately 150 additional multi-exponentiations (see appendix of [CFMT96] ). Withdrawal of the coin is nothing more than an RSA blind signature [Chat331 on H ( N l l b ) , where H is a one-way function and b is a random value. The bank's public key is chosen based on the value of the coin. z;, .
The payment protocol consists of two parts: ~ (Coin Authentication) U convinces R that the coin is a legitimate coin (i.e., (1) it is signed by B, and (2) N is of the correct form).
-(Denomination Revelation) Nodes of a tree defined by N are "opened" such that if the spent amount exceeds the monetary value of the coin then N can be factored.
The coin authentication protocol in combination with the denomination protocol guarantee that N is a composite of the form N = p'qj where p , q are primes with p z 3 mod 8, q E 7 mod 8 and i , j are odd integers. If a node is double spent (same node rule), or if an ancestor or descendant of an already spent node is opened (root route rule), then using [Oka95] in conjunction with the observation of [CFMT96] N will be factored and gp' The reader should note that the same N is used for each coin with the same license. Hence, coins can be linked. Our system does not have this property.
(mod P ) will be determined.
In [Oh951 N was a Williams Integer, i.e., i = j = 1, however, as observed in [CFM1'96] the [Oh951 protocols can only guarantee that N is of the form presented above.
The basic idea
Okamoto's scheme [Oka95] is quite efficient. In fact it is only inefficient during the account establishment protocol. To emulate the functionality of this protocol, all that is needed is a method for providing a receiver R with an N , such that (1) N is a composite of two numbers, (2) N is signed by the bank, and (3) R (and subsequently the bank, at deposit time) is guaranteed that if N is factored, the owner of the coin will be identified.
The denomination revelation protocol of [Oka95] guarantees condition (1). It determines that N is of the form pi$ and allows the generation of a binary tree such that, each tree node represents a portion of the coin's value, and overspending results in factoring N .
We suggest a new approach for withdrawal (i.e., signing N ) and coin authentication (i.e., proving the correctness of N to 2 ) . Our idea is to modify the Brands [Bra93b] protocol for withdrawal and coin authentication. At withdrawal, 2 1 randomly generates N = pq and identifies the particular withdrawal (hence himself) with I (mod P ) where 91, g2 are generators of the subgroup GQ of Z;. During withdrawal, U ends up with a message ( A = gyqg;
and a signature on A , B: signa(A, B ) . Hence ( 2 ) above is guaranteed. The correctness of A and the unforgeability of the signature are guaranteed by the protocol in [BraSSb] .
To guarantee condition (3), we observe that during payment N is revealed and if the coin is over-spent N can be factored, based on the result in [Oka95] and as corrected in [CFMT96] . At coin authentication U proves that A z g r X (mod P ) for some X (mod P ) . Since the withdrawal guarantees that A E g:qg:
(mod P ) , this indirectly guarantees that N = pq, i.e., the factorization of N reveals the user's identity I . Notice though that this only holds if we guarantee that for a given g 1 P , g 1 q , g l N with g 1 P q z g l N (mod P ) , we have that N = pq E 2 (instead of simply N z pq (mod Q)). We call this property "multiplicative commitment". There are various promising ways to satisfy it, such as working over a composite modulus (instead of a prime P ) , or limiting the size of p , q so that no wrap-around occurs in the index operations (i.e., in gYq (mod P ) , pq < Q, where Q is the order of g1 in Z:). Here we present a concrete way of satisfying this multiplicative property using a range-bounded commitment (i.e., by limiting the size of p , q ) .
g'; g g 4 Range-bounded commitment
The idea of checking whether a committed integer is in a specific range was developed in [Oka95] for license generation. We shall call such protocols rangebounded commitments (RBC). Here we formalize the notion of RBC and present an efficient instantiation based on the Discrete Logarithm Assumption.
This protocol is of iridependent value and can be used in limiting the range of numbers in other protocols; e.g., in the group signature scheme of [CS97, pp. 422, 4231 it is proposed to limit the size of Alice's secret key (z) using a cutand-choose approach; our range-bounded commitment is a much more efficient way to implement this check. A range-bounded commitment (informal def.) is a protocol between a prover, P , and a verifier, V , with which P commits to a string, x, and proves to V that z is within a predetermined range, H , with accuracy 6. Hence the protocol uses a secure bit commitment as a building block; then, with overwhelming probability in the security parameter k , P can conduct an efficient proof as long as 0 5 x < 2H and V is convinced that7 1x1 5 ( 1 + 6 ) H . In the process a negligible in k amount of information about x is leaked to V .
We now present an efficient range-bounded commitment protocol based on the DLA in which P sends commitment X g" mod P and then proves to verifier V that 1x1 5 (1 + S ) H mod Q. Setup: Input a range H and a security parameter k .
Choose the accuracy 6 such that 6 > ( 2 k + 2 ) / H ; this ensures that for a legitimate prover the probability of failure or of information leak is negligible. Select primes Q, P with P = 2 Q + 1, IQI = 2 ( 1 + 6 ) H + 6 . (For simplicity we assume that 6 is calculated so that SH is an integer.) Secret input to P is x, with 0 5 x < 2 H . Common input is a commitment X The protocol: (For iteration i )
(1) P picks u, ER (0,. . .,2(l+'lH -1}, and sends U, ( 2 ) V sends e , E R ( 0 , . . . , 2k -1).
( 3 ) P responds with u: = e i x + u i .
(4) V verifies g":
The can onlycheat by guessing e;, with probability of success 1 / 2 k in each iteration.
For completeness, notice that a legitimate P (i.e., for which 0 5 x < a H ) fails to convince V when, in some iteration i , ui 2 2(1+6)H -e i z . The probability of this happening is at most 2 k + H -( 1 + 6 ) H = 2k-6H and, for j rounds, 1 -(1 -2 k -6 H ) j . From the choice of 6 and j = 2 , this becomes 1 -(1 -2 -k -2 ) j = g" mod P on x.
Xe*Ui mod P and 0 5 u: < 2(l+'lH.
Throughout this paper, Icy( denotes the length of a in bits.
For secrecy, the probability that V can extract some information regarding z is negligible in k , as analyzed in [FGY96] where operations with exponents are also performed on the integers-but for a different reason and without checking the range. Formally, we can prove t,he following theorem:
Thenreml. Assumang g" above protocol as a range-bounded commztment.
Remarks: For applicability in our e-cash scheme, the leak of information about z from X E g x mod P does not impact security sincc X is already known to V .
We also want to note that it is possible to use similar ways a s [CS97] to "blind" the commitrncnt on X = gxl i.e., by commiting to X = g"GY for a second generator G and random y, and conducting a proof of knowledge of x , y in parallel.
(mod P ) as a secure strang commitment on x, the
The scheme Bank Initialization (setup) procedure:
The bank B chooses the security parameters k and H , and computes 6 > ( 2 k + 2 ) / H and primes Q , P , with P = 2Q + 1, I&/ = 2(1 + 6 ) H + 6. Intuitively, k controls security for the bank and H security for the users (anonymity). For the remaining of the paper the notation for modulo operations is simplified; e.g., h (mod P ) is written h = g " . All arithmetic is performed in a subgroup GQ of 2; of order Q , except for the operations involving exponents, which are performed in ZQ. B chooses: -A private key z ER ZQ (a different key can be used for every denomination).
B publicizes the description of GQ (i.e., P and Q ) , the generator-tuple ( 9 , g1 , g 2 ) , the description of 31,31~,311,.. ., and its public keys h = g " , h i = g;", i = ( 1 , 2 ) .
User Initialization (account establishment) procedure:
The user U shows (by physical or other means) his identity to the bank B and then U and B establish a means with which an authenticated channel can be used during withdrawal.
Withdrawal
The signature that is used by the bank to sign a coin is a variation of the Schnorr signature [Schgl] and is also used in [Bra93b] . The signature signs(A, B ) on the pair ( A , B ) E GQ x GQ, consists of a tuple ( z , a , b , T ) E GQ x GQ x GQ x Z Q , such that:
(1) g r = hNH (A,B,z,a,b) , and A' = Z u f l ( A t B , z , a , b ) b
The withdrawal protocol
At the beginning of the withdrawal protocol, the user creates an authenticated channel with the bank. This is needed in all e-cash (and physical cash!) protocols to guarantee that only the owner of an account withdraws money from it and that the user is communicating with the real bank.
-U : (This step can be pre-computed.) Select primes p E 3 mod 8, q E 7 mod 8 at random such that Ipl = 1qI 5 H = (IQI -6)/[2( 1 + S)] and calculate N = pq.
Send I = g y .
-U , B : Using the runge-bounded commitment with security parameter k and range H , U proves to B-in an interactive way and with just one iterationthat he knows the representation of I w.r.t. g l (i.e., the number p ) and that (mod Q) to 24, and debit U's account.
(mod Q), to get the signature (2, a, b, r) on ( A , B ) .
Payment & Deposit
We remind the reader that [Oka95], given a composite N signed by the bank, shows in the denomination revelation how to define a coin as a binary tree, and identify the user upon over-spending. Since we have a different signature scheme for N , we describe a new verification in the coin authentication below; otherwise payment and deposit are the same as in [0ka95].
Coin Authentication: coin, ( A , B ) . This protocol guarantees that if one of the node rules (see Section 2) is violated, then U has released enough information to allow B to factor N . Note that if k' < k/4 nodes are spent, then 2 . (k/4 -k') additional square roots of randomly chosen numbers must be shown by the user; these are described in [Oka95]'s coin authentication and are also performed here.
Prove that
Deposit: R sends the payment transcript to B.
Efficiency
We examine the efficiency when H = Ipl = IqI = 256, k = 40, N = 512 bits,8 IQI = 688 (i.e., 6 M 0.33), IPI = 689, and the binary tree has 18 levels, i.e., the divisibility precision is 217, hence sufficient to divide a $1,000 coin down to 1 cent. We assume the existence of fast, random hash functions. No pre-processing is assumed (unless explicitly stated). In practice several of the steps can be pre-computed. Below we compare our system with [Oka95] when [Oka95] is run with the setup at each withdrawal. Also, as a baseline, we use exponentiations over a 512 prime modulus with 512 bit exponents, since the two systems use a different modulus at different steps in the protocols. some of our exponentiations, including the ones in our range-bounded commitment, are approximately 6 times less expensive than [Oka95] . We should note that a multi-exponentiation (of the form gf'g;") costs the equivalent of 1.2 exponentiations [Oka95, Knu811.
At withdrawal U and 8 perform the equivalent of 12 full exponentiations modulo N (512 bits). U also needs to calculate one Williams integer, but he can pre-compute one any time before withdrawal. In contrast, in [Oka95] U needs to perform more than 4000 exponentiations" when setup is performed at each withdrawal to obtain the same functionality (i.e., to obtain unlinkability between coins in both systems). This equates to approximately 32,000 multiexponentiations for the 512 bit baseline.
In the coin authentication phase, U transmits 774 Bytes. U needs to perform the equivalent of around 5 exponentiations modulo N (if he re-computes A , Y and z ) and R around 7.
In the denomination revelation phase," 9 nodes (on the average) are paid. For each node, two 512 bit values are sent to R, for a total of 1,152 Bytes.
In addition, about 320 Bytes (on the average) are sent for verifying that N is a Williams integer. As in [Oka95] the user computes approximately 20 square roots (mod N ) which the shop verifies.
Security
We now present our security model and give an overview of the proofs.
As with [Oka95], our security model has been based on [FY93] and is modified to work for divisible, unlinkable coins. We model the security of our scheme by requiring that it satisfies four requirements, which are slightly stronger than the corresponding ( ' H , ' H o , ' H 1 , . . .) act like random oracles.
Remarks on these assumptions are provided in appendix A.
Our Withdrawal protocol assumption is based on the representation problem in groups of prime order, which in t,urn is equivalent to the discrete logarithm For our proofs we use lemma 3 below, which has been proven by [PS96] based on the DLA and our Hash functions assumption. Schnorr signatures [SchSI] 
Lemma 3. (Schnorr signatures)

Extensions and open problems
Transferability: There is a general method with which a coin can be transferred from the shop (who now acts as a payer) to another payee, proposed in [vA90] . The method preserves the anonymity of the shop and is applicable to all anonymous off-line e-cash schemes. The coins grow upon each transfer, but [CP93a] showed that this is inevitable, and the approach is asymptotically optimal. Intuitively, the shop obtains a "blank" (zero-valued) blind coin from the bank, and includes it in the hash of the random challenge to the user (for exact payments divisible "blank" coins can be obtained). Then the shop can transfer the payment by "spending" the blank coin with a payee. Note that the blank coin is "bound" to the original payment (since it is included in the random challenges used for that payment), while the shop cannot over-spend, or it is identified. The shop only needs to contact the bank (in an off-line manner) in order to obtain "blank" coins; finding algorithms to withdraw multiple (unlinkable) "blank coins faster than performing multiple withdrawals in parallel is a problem pending further research.
Tracing methods:
The tracing techniques of [CMS96, DFTY97, FTY961 build on withdrawal protocols that are similar to [Bra93b] . Thus, adapting their functionality to our protocols is straightforward.
Finding double-spenders:
We remark that when a user over-spends the bank establishes a link between her/his deposit and withdrawal protocols for identification; ideally a link to the user's account should be possible, to minimize database accesses (since accounts are much fewer than withdrawals). Fortunately, the additional cost necessary for this case is minimal, and is omitted here for clarity; efficiency is only marginally affected (one Schnorr proof at payment) and security remains intact, with the exception of our first assumption which needs to be modified as shown in Appendix A.
It is apparent that the storage, computation and communication requirements of our scheme are minimal, resulting in the first anonymous, unlinkable divisible off-line electronic cash scheme that can be implemented in practice.
Two interesting open problems are to reduce the security of the system to more standard assumptions, and to find a way to break the linkability between portions of the same coin. l 3 In particular if the bank can link coins then it can trace users, except for some special cases, e.g., when all users have made the exact same number of withdrawals and payments.
